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REFERENDUM! ON WAR
BY JAMES D. BARXETT
NO TRUE believer in the principle of democratic rule could con-
tend that wars should be made by the g^ovemment of a dem-
ocracy otherwise than in accordance with public opinion. But there
is controversy as to how far and in what manner such opinion should
be ascertained.
The proposal is older than the Great War, but it was the appar-
ent drift of the United States into the war that first gave rise to
much practical discussion of the application of the referendum to a
declaration of war by congress. Advocates of the referendum were,
many, if not all of them, opposed to our participation in the war,
and the proposal was at that time, therefore, naturally obnoxious to
all (including this writer) who favored our participation in the war.
The same sort of opposition met the proposal of the referendum on
war when advocated in connection with the ratification of the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations. But the referendum may now, per-
haps, be considered more or less in the abstract, as a democratic
institution, and its real merits appreciated.
In the absence of proper means of bringing public opinion to
bear, the people's representatives may easily involve the country in
a war without popular approval. This is considered to have been
the case with the German people in the Great War. Said our presi-
dent : "We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no
feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was
not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this
war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It
was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in
the old, unhappy days when people were nowhere consulted by their
rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interests of dynas-
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ties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to
use their fellow-men as pawns and tools." ^ And the same is pos-
sible in our own democracy.
Experience has shown that a people, although bitterly opposed
to a war, will, once it is actually begun by the constituted authori-
ties, cease their opposition and aid in bringing the war to a success-
ful conclusion. As Bryan, an opponent to our entering into the
Great War, said, after the decision had been made : "There is no
such thing as pacifism now. No matter what our own and separate
views on the question of war and preparedness before the war, there
is only one opinion now, and that is for the best preparedness and
in as short a time as possible." - Let the people be substituted for
congress as the final authority, so far as possible.
Whatever the actual facts in the case, a government always
necessarily assumes that a war it wages is a popular war, and it
must do all in its power to make it actually such, once the war has
begun. "It is . . . evident from the run of facts as exemplified in
these modern wars that while any breach of the peace takes place
only on the initiative and at the discretion of the government, or
state, it is always requisite in furtherance of such warlike enterprise
to cherish and eventually to mobilize popular sentiment in support
of any warlike move." ^
It is sheer folly to assert that "the constituted authorities,"
elected by the people, necessarily voice the sentiments of the people
in regard to war. It is true that if unusual circumstances permit,
as in the presidential election of 1916, entry into war becomes more
or less an issue. Thus, both Wilson and Ford received many votes
because of their inclination "to keep us out of the war." But in
such cases issues and men are necessarily badly mixed, and the pop-
ular majority is not really finally conclusive of anything at all. How-
ever, insofar as such a majority is used as evidence of public opinion
on war, the principle of the popular referendum is practically
accepted.
And the principle is in fact accepted generally, in the view that
the authorities should and do attempt to ascertain the people's will
'^Congressional Record, Vol. 55, p. 103 (1917).
2 New York Times, April 23, 1917. See also Henry Ford, Ibi<f., August 16,
1917. "To this day I regard the Mexican war ... as one of the most unjust
ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. It was an instance of the
republic following the bad example of European monarchies, in not consider-
ing justice in their desire to acquire additional territory. . . . Even if the
annexation itself coald be justified, the manner in which the subseouent war
was forced upon Mexico cannot." U. S. Grant, Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 53 (1885).
3 T. Veblen, NaUire of Peace, p. 4 (1917).
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in the matter. Referring to the Great War, it is said: "Editorial
comments in more than two thousand daily newspapers assured the
president that the people were with him at each step toward the
final call to arms. How carefully the head of the nation studied the
popular effect of these messages was demonstrated by the fact that
summaries of editorial opinion embracing extracts from several hun-
dred leading newspapers in every part of the country were laid
before him within twenty-four hours after the publication of an
address or message." * On March 21 the state of public opinion
was more than evident, it was loudly vocal, and the president would
hesitate no longer." ^ The president stated his position thus : "One
day one of my colleagues said to me, *Mr. President, I think the
people of the country would take your advice and do what you sug-
gested.' 'Why,' I said, 'that is not what I am waiting for. . . . I do
not want them to wait on me ; I am waiting on them. I want to
know what the conscience of the country is speaking. I want to
know what the purpose is arising in the minds of the people of this
country with regard to this world situation. I must wait until I
know that I am interpreting their purpose, then I will know that I
have got an irresistible power behind me.' And that is exactly what
happened ! When I thought I heard that voice, it was then that I
proposed to the congress of the United States that we should include
ourselves in the challenge that Germany was giving to mankind." '^
It is of course the right, and the duty, of citizens to influence
their government to proper action in making or refraining from war,
as well as in other directions. As Roosevelt said : "While I believe
that once war is on, every citizen should stand by the land, yet in
any crisis which may or may not lead up to war, the prime duty of
the citizen is, by criticism and advice, even against what he may
know to be the majority opinion of his fellow-citizens, to insist that
the nation take the right course of action." ''
The principle of the proper relation of representatives to the
people in this regard, which, under present conditions, would prob-
ably be universally accepted, is embodied in a powerful address by
Elihu Root^ before the Union League Club. "Germany is making
war upon us. . . . Gradually a feeling is making its appearance,
a restiveness of the people of the country. . . . There are multitudes
4H. S. Houston, Blocking Neiv Wars, p. 132 (1918).
5 J. S. Basett, Our War With Germany, p. 107 (1919).
6 H. Foley, Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations, pp. 13-14
(1923).
"^ Nezv York Times' Current Historv, Vol. 3, p. 18 (1915).
« March 20, 1917. United States and War, pp. 27-32.
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of American citizens who are asking, 'What can I do for my coun-
try now in this grave crisis?' They can do nothing except through
the executive department at Washington. What is there we can do?
Only this : We can perform the duty of a free, self-governing people,
by speaking in clear and certain tones, so that the spirit and the
purpose and the will of a free people may be heard in Washington,
and our government may know that the American people will be
behind it, supporting it, approving it, sustaining it in maintaining
the honor and the integrity and the independence and the freedom
of our republic. My diagnosis of the situation is that the president
wants to hear from the people. He has said so many times. He
wants to hear whether the people want him to go on and act. Let
us answer to his want and tell him that the American people do
want the government not to discuss, and plan, and talk about what
is going to be done, but to act. Let us say to him, and if we say it,
others will say it also, that we wish all the powers he has now to
be exercised ; and let us say to congress—and if we say it others
will say it also—that we wish to give to the executive all the addi-
tional powers that may be found needed for the exercise of the
entire force of this great nation for the support of its independence
and honor. . . . Now, if our voice can be heard, if we can do some-
thing, anything, to make our government feel that the free and loyal
people of America want it to assert the principle of American liberty
and freedom, and to assert them with the power of this great people,
for God's sake, let us do it."
And it is the general custom of individuals and groups of every
description, through platform and press, by letters, petitions, and
memorials to their representatives, and otherwise, to urge or to dis-
courage the government's entry into war. But however frequent
and emphatic such demands may be they are, at best, but a poor
index of what public opinion actually is. What is really needed is
the expression of opinion by all of the people rather than by part of
the people. This can be obtained in no other way than by the sub-
mission of the question to all of the people.
There is certainly nothing of more vital importance to the people,
and nothing which the people have more of a right to decide for
themselves, than the question of making war. A matter of such
vital interest as war is always considered by the people from its
earliest possibility ; the facts in the case, widely published, are gen-
erally available for their consideration ; and the people are thus
better qualified for deciding this question than any other question
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of policy that can possibly come before them. Opponents of the
referendum should, logically, also oppose all those practices, now
generally approved, the object of which is to influence the govern-
ment's policy as to the declaration of war.
Opposition to the referendum on war is, at bottom, opposition to
the principle of democratic government in general." "If there is
any merit at all in the doctrine that governments must derive their
just powers from the consent of the governed, surely the governed
ought to have the. right to decide for themselves, by popular vote, a
question as important as going to war." ^°
It is very true that there may be cases of emergency in which it
would be entirely impracticable for congress to consult the people
upon the policy of declaring war. But probably no responsible per-
son has ever seriously advocated a mandatory referendum that
should bind congress in cases of emergency.
The proposition has usually assumed one of two forms. One
requires a referendum of the declaration of war, except in the case
of "threatened invasion," "actual invasion," "imminent danger,"
"defensive warfare"—in general, in case of "emergency." The
other calls for an "advisory" vote on the question of peace or war
—generally, or except in case of invasion, etc.
In either form the immediate decision must of course rest with
congress. Whether under the circumstances an emergency has arisen
of sufficient gravity to justify action without consulting the people,
whether the advice should under sudden change of conditions be
followed, can be decided immediately by no other authority. But in
the absence of a popular vote, no declaration of war should be effec-
tive unless passed by an extraordinary majority of the two houses
of congress.
Doubtless it is possible that congress, even under this restriction,
might abuse its discretion in this matter, as it does in many other
matters. However, much the same situation obtains at present in
relation between congress and the president in making war.
Although the final authority is vested in congress, before congress
can act the initiative may be taken by the president, and thus war
^ "The re?dv, courageous recognition of national duty must necessarily lie
with those charged with supreme responsibility, who are best able to judge of
the exact situation, and the measures required for the security of the true inter-
ests of the state, and international society in general.
. . . The 'democratiza-
tion of foreign policies" . . . cannot mean that democracy, by a process of
initiatiye and referendum, could commit the folly of refusing confidence and
support to its responsible statesmen in times of diplomatic complications and
international danger." P. M. Brown, International Realities, pp. 190, 199 (1917).
10 W. J. Bryan, in Congressional Record, Vol. I, p. 1865 (1920).
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may in fact be begun without the authority of congress. But the
possibiHties of the presidents' abuse of power are much greater than
are the probabiHties. The final discretion of congress operates as a
very substantial check upon him.
In case of the abuse of power by congress resulting in the arbi-
trary determination of the existence of an emergency and a declara-
tion of war contrary to the wishes of the people, it is very probable
that, except under the most extraordinary circumstances, public
sentiment would yield, however reluctantly, to the decision even if
further provision should be made for an appeal from congress to
the people zvhile hostilities continued. But a really outraged public
sentiment would have at least some protection from' such further
provision.
Of course, it would be best, if possible, to secure world-wide
provision for the referendum through international convention ; but,
in the absence of such convention, there is no good reason why the
referendum with the limitations advocated, should not be adopted
first by the United States acting alone—and this whether or not
the United States becomes a party to the League of Nations or any
similar form of world organization.
